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Introduction
He who tries to write a history of the earlier informal Arabic logic has to do two things: (1) reconstruct the historical facts concerning its development, and (2) reformulate it formally 1 according to that reconstruction. Thus, (1) is a necessary step for (2) . In this paper I shall concentrate only on (1) letting (2) for further research. The reason for (1) is due to that most of the accounts we have about it were not intended to be a definite history of the Arabic informal logic but as a complementary history to other branches of study such as history of Islamic law (for example: [82, 2 . Furthermore, these accounts disagree with each other 3 as a result to the paucity of the resources or its fabrications. Thus, the historian of informal logic is compelled to reconstruct history on his own, introducing to this process some hypotheses and theories about the real history and the mental activities such as the translation movement and how texts transform as we shall see in due course.
However, the history of informal Arabic logic could be written through four disciplines: (1) Islamic law and exegesis (of the Scripture), (2) Arabic rhetoric, (3) Arabic and Islamic theology, and (4) Islamic peripatetic, especially its commentaries on Aristotle's Topics and On Rhetoric. In this paper, I shall trace its development only through Arabic and Islamic law, exegesis and rhetoric. That qiyās is a tool for inferring good things, if it led to what is good and known it should be taken, but if it leads to what is bad and denied it should be abandoned; that is because he who uses qiyās is not pursuing only qiyās but the good and known things and what is assigned as justice by its people. Thus, 'the defenders of 'raʾy'', as Goldziher said, fabricated the second part of the cited passage (2) to enforce their position.
However, this letter is a keystone for discovering the evolution of the Arabic intellectual movement (translation movement) and the transmission of the Rabbinic logical tradition into the Arabs and Islamic legal system as we shall show.
'Umar I and the Translation Movement
'Umar I was not illiterate, 'he was reading the books' [61 iii, p. 248] [cf. Also, 20 iv, p. 201 ]. Moreover, he had always been interesting in the Bible or the ancient religious books 14 and Jewish narratives 15 , he was even copying the Bible 16 , he also permitted to Tamym l-D ry (d.660) to tell religious stories 17 in the mosque, and let the Jewish Rabbi Ka'b l-Ᾱ b r 18 (d.653) and the scholar most influenced by Jewish traditions, i.e. Ibn 'Abb s (d. 688) 19 , have been the most prominent members of his circle. These facts make us infer that 'Umar I was a man of culture 20 , especially that he was alleged to have had important role in collecting the Qurʾān [ 21 . Although Mu ammad's objection to his reading and copying books 22 , when he became a caliph he made the translation of the Bible more disciplined than it was at Mu ammad's time 23 . Thus, we can infer that he established the first translation movement in the Arabic and Islamic civilization from the other Semitic languages into Arabic 24 as a result to his previous interest in the scripture on the one hand and the need to understanding the Qur'ānic hints to the Semitic stories on other hand. The two figures who mainly carried the burden of this movement were the Yemenites Tamym l-D ry and Ka'b l-Ᾱ b r. As the early Muslim society was as yet unfamiliar with organized institutions, story-telling was the first way of translating; hence the translation was oral not written. Thus, 'Umar I gave permission for l-D ry to narrate in the mosque, he did so also with Ka'b 25 , and the secretary of this movement was Ibn 'Abb s 26 , and it is not surprise that Ibn 'Abb s' family had the legal guardianship on Ka'b 27 (he was their mawlā). But which books were being translated by Ka'b and the others? By answering this question we can at least partly solve the problem of how l-Š fi'y was influenced by the Rabbinic logical tradition. The answer also will let us get rid from what I would call it the ḵaldwnian hypothesis, i.e., that the first Muslims were influenced only by Jewish oral recounts and superstitions 28 , anecdotes [2, p. 1] or at best some isolated sayings of the Rabbis (from the Talmud) [40, pp. 40; 44] .
There are two books candidates to have been translated orally by 'Umar's translation movement, i.e. Avot de Rabby Natan or The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan version A (henceforth referred to as ARNA) and the Toseft'a. In this paper I shall concentrate only on ARNA sayings and themes from which many passages were frequently cited by and from 'Umar's secretary of the translation movement (Ibn 'Abb s) and his circle and the adherents of this heritage. If we are able to prove this, it will be easy to prove in addition the transition of the Rabbinic hermeneutical sequence through this book to the early Arabic and Islamic legal traditions, and then to l-Š fi'y, because ARNA contains that sequence.
To wit: What I shall do would run as the following: Firstly, I shall prove that 'Umar's translators transmitted this book into Arabic through embedding it in some of the prophet's traditions on the one hand, and through its influence on Ibn 'Abb s and his circle on the other. Then, I shall show the influence of the Hebrew logical tradition on Ibn 'Abb s and his circle.
Secondly, I shall show how most of 'Umar's translators were Yemenites which implies the spread of this book and the Rabbinic logical tradition in Yemen. Thirdly, I shall trace l-Š fi'y's biography to show how he was indirectly influenced by the Jewish logical tradition and how he amended it and why.
The Fathers in Arabic and Islamic Traditions
We have two versions of The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan: A and B. Though ARN has a Palestinian origin, both of its versions were known to the Babylonians [80, pp. 16 -18] . Some scholars even think that version A may have been written in Babylonia [ibid., n. 44]. Because of this, Version A then is our target, and it is thought to have probably been compiled sometime between the seventh and ninth centuries [39, p. xxi] . This would be sufficient for it to be known for Ka'b and the Jews of Yemen. We know that Ka'b l-Ᾱ b r had books other than the Torah 29 , and he possibly belonged to a Rabbinic tradition 30 , therefore it is probable that ARNA was one of these books. What supports this is the following sentence of a certain exilarch to the Muslims about Ka 31 .These sayings of 'the companions of the prophets' could not be anything other than the books of the Rabbis, and ARNA is one of these books. Moreover, I shall prove now the influence of ARNA in the fabricated prophets' traditions and in Ibn 'Abb s and his circle opinions.
However, such influence happened on three axes, literal translation, translating the meaning and transmitting themes of ARNA.
But first of all, I have to refer briefly to a methodological problem about the traditions which we are going to depend on (and also to the ones we have quoted so far). Some of these traditions are relating to the sayings of the prophet ( adyṯ), and others are relating to the exegetical and legal traditions, especially of Ibn 'Abb s' traditions. On the whole, there are three positions concerning the authenticity of these traditions weather in respect of their content (matn) or ascription ('isnād) 32 . The first position is extremely skeptical about them. Thus 36 . But on the other hand the skepticism of Wansbrough is not acceptable either; we cannot imagine a sudden appearance of the written Islamic literature at the beginnings of the third century A.H. without there being a background for that emergence. This brings us to the third position. This position, on the whole, claims that if we denied the authenticity of the traditions, we could accept that the ideas which lie behind them go back to the earlier Islam. Thus, U. Rubin expresses this position concerning the prophet's sayings as follows: 'But the fact that traditions cannot be dated earlier than 100 A.H. [719 C.E.] does not mean that the ideas reflected in them were not circulated prior to 100 A.H. The lack of documentation does not mean non existence. In other words, the dates of traditions and the dates of exegetical ideas must be considered separately' [79, p. 149 ]. Schoeler and his school believed also in the possibility to reach to the ideas of the first century A.H. by isnād cum matn analysis 37 . Thus, the sayings of the prophet or of Ibn 'Abb s express on traditions, in the technical meaning of this term 38 , therefore it will not come as a surprise to find that even some of the words of Ibn 'Abb s' sayings were kept sometimes literally in the minds of their transmitters as I shall show. This position seems plausible and it is our position in this paper, and our reconstruction will prove it. It is the time now to show how ARNA influenced Ibn 'Abb s and his circle.
The Literal Translation
I shall display in this subsection only two traditions, the first one is attributed to Ibn 'Abb s and the other to the prophet:
' ‫ء‬ ‫ل‬ : ‫ع‬ ‫بن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ي‬ ‫غ‬ ‫ي‬ / Ibn 'Abb s said student of the Qur'ān are jealous' 39 In ARNA we find the same wording: ' /they [students of the Torah] acted jeaously toward each other.' 40 The following second tradition I divided it into two divisions, the first division does not interest us here, though I shall discuss it in the next subsection of translating by meaning.
'… ‫ع‬ ‫ف‬ ‫م‬ ‫أنس‬ ‫:عن‬ '(a) ‫ل‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ع‬ ‫سل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ء‬ ‫أم‬ ‫ء‬ ‫ل‬ (b) ‫لط‬ ‫ي‬ ‫لم‬ ‫م‬ ‫ط‬ ‫لس‬ / … from Ᾱnas tracing in back to the prophet '(a) Students of the Qur'ān are secretaries of the messengers for the worshipers, (b) unless they make intimacy with ruling powers'.' 41 In ARNA, we find: ' / Do not make intimacy with the ruling powers' (my translation). 42 However, it should be noted here the following:
1. Both the verbs and ‫لط‬ ‫ت‬ are verbs in the increased conjunctional form, and both of them are close semantically, i.e. acquaintance, affinity, knowledge, intimacy and communion. 2. The meaning of the Arabic word āl-sulțān does not signify a king, this was a later development 43 , but it signifies power, authority or sovereign 44 , and this is the same meaning of , hence I translated it in both of the texts as ruling powers. (Nuesner, J. [77] , was translating it sometimes as authority, pp. 84-5, and sometimes as sovereign, p. 84) 3. ARNA continues 'for once his name comes to the attention of the ruling powers,' (Goldin's [39] trans. P.62). This sentence has close relationship to the concept of intimacy or āl-muḵālața 45 in the Arabic tradition. 4. Again, ARNA continues 'they cast their eye upon him and slay him,' (ibid.). This we shall find in another tradition transmitted by Abw-Hurayra, but the translation will be by meaning 46 .
Translating the Meaning
The following traditions are translations from ARNA by meaning; I shall first provide the Arabic tradition then its equivalent(s) in ARNA: In ARNA we find: [26, p. 57] AND RECEIVE ALL MEN WITH A CHEERFUL FACE: what is that? This teaches that if one gives his fellow all the good gifts in the world with a downcast face, Scripture accounts it to him as though he had given him naught. But if he receives his fellow with a cheerful face, even though he gives him naught, Scripture accounts it to him as though he had given him all the good gifts in the world. (Goldin's [39] translation, p.73. with my qualifications).
We should note the following points of the last tradition and its equivalent in ARNA:
The Arabic tradition can be divided into two units; (a) and (b). Also the ARNA divides into two units; (a) the text of the Talmudic father's tractate, (b) explanation. b)
The Arabic tradition kept ARNA text; but it brings the explanation first, then the main text of the Talmudic tractate. c)
The second unit of the Arabic tradition is nearly the same of ARNA's first unit, it has even the same words, i.e. ‫ى‬ ‫ت‬ = ‫בל‬ ‫מ‬ = receive. ‫طلق‬ = ‫סב‬ = cheerful. d) Abw ʿ Imr n l-Jawny is one of the transmitters on the authority of Abw lJalad, who was influenced by the Jewish traditions and belonged to Ibn 
Transmitting Themes and the Rabbinic Sequence
The two most important themes of The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan are the number seven and the hermeneutical theme as we shall see, but before displaying them I shall display another one as more evidence to translating ARNA and its influence on the Arabic intellectuals.
In ARNA, there is a theme in the chapters 1 to 14 about the transition of the Torah from Moses to Joshua to the elders to the Judges to the prophets to the men of great assembly to students of the Torah 53 , and after chapter 14 we read mainly the sayings of these students. This theme Ka'b transmitted to his colleague Abw l-Dard ' 54 55 . It should be noted also that Ka'b was interested 56 in the Qur' nic verse which talked about bequeathing the book to the worshipers 57 , and his interest is mentioned in the context of his replying to the Rabbis who blamed him for his conversion to Islam. Thus, he was establishing a new generation of scholars by his contribution in 'Umar's translation movement, following ARNA steps.
In ARNA there is a complete chapter (Goldin's [39] trans. Ch. 37, pp. 152 -157) about number 7, this I shall call the seven theme. This theme talks about how many things are arranged in seven levels. Thus, 'there are seven created things;' 'seven types of Pharisee;' seven things God created the world with; 'seven heavens;' seven characteristics for the righteous man, clod and wise men… etc…, we find this theme also with Ibn 'Abb s and his circle. Our claim here is in opposite to Goldfeld's opinion that the seven theme (especially in exegesis) only founded at the beginning of the second century A.H. [38, p. 20] by Ibn 'Abb s' disciples via introducing it on the mouth of Ibn Mas'wd [ibid., p. 21]. But as I have referred before, we can assume that many of Ibn 'Abb s' traditions, not necessarily literally, probably go back to him, and Goldfeld believes in this too [ibid., p. 8]. In addition, we have a tradition (see below) that goes back to Ibn 'Abb s himself concerning the number seven, therefore why would Ibn 'Abb s' disciples fabricate a tradition on the authority of Ibn Mas'wd while they have already at their disposal a tradition that goes back to their own master? Moreover, we find also the seven theme in Amr's traditions, which means it was so spread in early Islam that we can be sure that it were current due to 'Umar's translation movement. However, the tradition which transmits clearly the seven theme is running as follows: On the authority of Sa'yd b. Jubayr, 'Umar asked Ibn 'Abb s, while they were being amongst the immigrants, about determining the time of laylat āl-Qadr, then Ibn 'Abb s replied:
God is an odd number and loves odd numbers, among his creation he has created seven heavens…, and he has created the earth in seven parts, and he has created the days to be seven in number, he has ordered the circling around the Ka'ba to be seven, throwing the stones to be seven, going and coming to Şaf and Marw to be seven, he has created the human being from seven and, he has made his daily sustenance from seven. The third thesis relates to the interpretation and understanding of scripture. However, ARNA 'is entirely devoted to the 'Aggadah' (Goldin's [39] introduction, p. xviii), it is a book in and about interpretation 58 . By Ka'b's translation of ARNA, he also transmitted the importance of interpreting the Qur'ān. Therefore, it is not strange to find Ibn 'Abb s' concentration to have been in exegesis, and to have had a great reputation as interpreter to the Qur'ān (cf. . Thus, Ibn 'Abb s interprets Q3:79 'Be Rabbis,' as be 'wise and jurists,' [19 vi, 7313] , and his disciples kept the same interpretation [ibid., 7306 -7312] as a continuation for the master's tradition. Ibn 'Abb s also was known as 'the Rabbi of this community / ‫م‬ ‫ه‬ ‫نى‬ ‫ب‬ ' [61 vi, p. 347] . This identification of interpretation, wisdom and jurisprudence on the one hand, and the interpreter, Rabbi, jurist and scholar on the other hand is a sign of extending the Rabbinic tradition in the Arabic environment by the translation movement and evidence of an oral translation of ARNA which bears all these features. This supports my claim that the transition of informal logic to the Arabs was through ARNA, especially if we recognized that ARNA puts down the rules of interpretation of Scripture in ch. 37, and connects them with the number seven which also was adopted by Ibn 'Abb s.
If we have a look at Ibn 'Abb s' method of interpretation we find it in harmony with these rules. In a recent study on the early interpretation of the Qur'ān, its author defines the method of Ibn 'Abb s (and others) and his school in interpretation as follows: 'Semantic similarity, that is, synonymy (āl-'āšbāh): In this technique, the exegete makes a semantic analogy between two ayahs through synonymy that exists between them either at the word level or at the thematic level.' [2, 60 . Accordingly, the Hebrew informal logical tradition was transmitted to the Arabs within their legal activity and hermeneutics or exegesis of the Qur'ān through ARNA thanks to 'Umar's translation movement. And the informal logical rules of that tradition continued especially with Ibn 'Abb s' school and his disciples 61 until they were delivered to l-Š fi'y who articulated them by the instruments of Aristotele's On Rhetoric. In the next section I shall show how this happened. [33] [34] . The last clause in this tradition 'he formulated his own judgment based on his own opinion /ijtahada rā'yuhu' is nothing but RS: 1-3; 6. Of course Ibn 'Uyayna transmitted also to l-Š fi'y the RS: 4-5. But we notice here two things: (a) that l-Š fi'y uses the two terms 'general and particular' ('āmm wa ḵāṣṣ) for the RS 4-5 which did not happen in Ibn 'Abb s' tradition and Ka'b's translations, (B) Also he uses the term qiyās for RS 1-3; 6. This can be explained as follows:
The Influence of the
RS:4-5, was already articulated with Muq til by giving them their names: 'in the Qur'ān there are particular and general / ‫ع‬ ‫خ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫'فى‬ [73 i, p. 27]. And we know that l-Š fi'y said 'People are dependent on Muq til in interpretation' [24 iv, p. 173] . This is an indicator about his borrowing Ibn Muq til's terminology for general and particular.
l-Š fi'y studied also at Medina 65 which had a linguistic school influenced by Iraqi schools [89, p. 228] where the term qiyās was being used for analogy [95, p. 35] 66 . And we know how l-Š fi'y was interested in the linguistic analysis of the Qur'ān [Risāla K 133-178], and his estimation of l-Kis 'y (d. 799), one of the champions of grammatical qiyās 67 , is well known 68 . Thus, l-Š fi'y joint this term for RS: 1-3; 6.
But 71 . This is what I shall prove now by analyzing his logical passages in his Risāla and their counterparts in Aristotle's On Rhetoric. And for the convenience, I shall abbreviate the Arabic translation of Aristotle's On Rhetoric as TAR, and when I quote from Badawi's 1979 edition [28] for this translation I shall abbreviate it as TAR B, while quoting from Lyons' 1982a [65] edition for the same translation will be abbreviated as TAR L. Also, I shall abbreviate the translated Aristotle as TA.
Along his writings, l-Š fi'y had only five explicit informal logical rules, three of them for the a fortiori argument, and the remaining two for analogy 72 .
āl-Šāfi'y's Three Rules of the a Fortiori
As we have said above, l-Š fi'y had three rules for the a fortiori, these rules are the same as in TAR. We should here notice the following remarks:
1. l-Š fi'y has retained some of the very words in TAR's text in his wording, i.e. āqall and ākthar in TAR and kaṯyr, ākṯar, āl-kaṯra, qalyl and āl-qilla in l-Š fi'y's wording. 2. l-Š fi'y's second rule (iḏā umida 'alā yasyr…) is not valid 73 , It is valid only for prohibition. But l-Š fi'y as a faithful follower to TAR (as I shall show below) introduced it for both prohibition and permission. 3. In l-Š fi'y's formulation, there is no mention to subjects and predicates. This is because TAR has none of these terms. That means that l-Š fi'y ' s source was Aristotle's On Rhetoric not Topics as Abdel-Rahman [1] has thought. That also explains why l-Š fi'y did not adopt the subjectpredicate scheme. / Concerning the greatness and smallness in things, the meaning of the greatest and the less, and the least, the very great or the very small, all of these are known from what we said before. When we talked about deliberative advice we explained what is the greatness of the good things, the best and the least. This is why I evaded Lowry's translation of bi faḍl āl-kaṯra 'alā āl-qilla as 'because of the [implied inferential] relationship of the greater to the lesser amount' [64, p.153] . The expression 'the implied inferential relationship' in Lowry's translation is not in l-Š fi'y's text. It is formal while l-Š fi'y's principle is rhetorical, religious, ethical and informal as in TAR (we should note here how the Syriac translator translated 'the least' as āl-āḵas which can mean also the vilest. Thus, there is an ethical connotation in the principle.) 74 5. However, we find alongside every formulation of this (ethical) principle in TAR a justification for using it from the lesser (good) to the greater (good), thus the full sentence of TAR's first sentence is as follows: Thus, each citing of the very principle is supplemented or preceded with justification which could be understood as a a justification for using the argumentum a minore ad maius in case of permission, and this is what l-Š fi'y did as a result of his reading of TAR; he put his invalid second rule of his informal logic immediately after his citing the principle. 6. It is clear now that l-Š fi'y understood that principle literally, which gave him justification to extend the argumentum a minore ad maius to apply on permissions cases too, and in this way he divided TAR.1's rule into two. Of course, if he had read Topics he would not have done this. That means more evidence that l-Š fi'y's source was TAR.
The third rule is the argumentum a majori ad minus, and we find it also at the same page in which TA speaks about the more and the less topic. Thus, TA says: As noted above, l-Š fi'y's converse formulation is valid. And he seems to have preferred the positive mood of the rule for his purposes. We should notice here that the word 'yumkinnān' can be read as 'could be' or 'to fall under,' i.e 'yakmunnān'. I put both readings in the translation until the text to be understandable. I think that l-Š fi'y also read both readings as it is clear from his wording of this rule below. However, the meaning of TAR's rule is:
TAR.2 ‫ص'‬ ‫أن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أقل‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ليس‬ ‫أنه‬ ‫ضح‬ ‫ف‬ ، ‫ي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أح‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ل‬ ‫م‬ ‫لك‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي‬ ‫لم‬ ‫أنه‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ضع‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ه‬

āl-Šāfi'y's Two Rules of Analogy
1. πα ά γ α is reasoning from part to part, and from like to like.
This happens when (a)
The similar things could be fallen under the same genus or meaning, and (b) there is obscurity about their similarity.
Accordingly; we have l-Š fi'y's definition of analogy which is dependent on the TAR as follows:
Sh. 4 ‫ص‬ [64, pp. 149-50] translated the word ma'nā as reason. But this misses the point. Firstly, the exact English equivalent of the word ma'nā is meaning not reason. Secondly, l-Š fi'y's intention is to search for a meaning not a reason, this is clear from the adjective 'such' in 'if we find such.' Thirdly, if we agreed that he was indirectly influenced by RS, it would naturally be that he intended a meaning not a reason. That is because RS:3 is related to searching for genus, a common meaning, or binyan av (establishing a principle) which is equivalent to the Arabic binā' aṣl. l-Š fi'y himself used the word ‫أصل'‬ / principle or element' in another wording for his rule: ‫صل'‬ ‫ى‬ ‫م‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ىء‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ه‬ ‫أح‬ ‫ين:‬ ‫ج‬ ‫من‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ل‬ / Qiyās has two aspects; the first one of them is that the thing has the same meaning of the original thing' [Risāla K: 1334]. 77 W. Hallaq [45] considered this rule as ratio legis, i.e. 'If the new case has the same ratio legis (ma'nā, lit. meaning) as that given to the parallel textual case, the ruling in the text must be transferred to the new case' [ibid., p.23]. Therefore, a jurist has to search for 'the 'purpose of a statute' [99, p. 310] according to the ratio legis. But l-Š fi'y did not mean that 78 , what he meant is that searching for a meaning covers both the known and the unknown cases. What confirms this is the example which l-Š fi'y gives for his Sh. Here what l-Shafi'i calls 'fall into this category' is nothing but the meaning, not the purpose, of 'incapability of providing for himself' which both the father and the child fall under it. Thus, l-Š fi'y is building a principle or genus or binyan av.
The other TAR definition of πα ά γ α is as follows: With the helping of the auxiliary 'could' of the first definition (as a result of l-Š fi'y's reading of ‫ي‬ ), which means that a thing may have many likes, l-Š fi'y gives his other definition.
Sh. 5.
‫ف‬ ، ‫ه‬ ‫أح‬ ‫من‬ ‫ش‬ ‫به‬ ‫أق‬ ‫شي‬ ‫الن‬ ، ‫غي‬ ‫من‬ ‫ىء‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ه‬ ‫م‬ ‫ىء‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ىء‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫لى‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ح‬ ‫به‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ء‬ ‫شي‬ / or we find the thing to resemble one thing or another, and if we find nothing closer to it in resemblance than one of them, then we should relate it to the most closer to it in resemblance [Risāla K: 125].
We should note here that this definition contains the term šabah, which I translated as resemblance and its derivatives, so also TAR contains the term mutashābih, one of the derivatives of the term šabah.
This rule has another variant which connects it with the previous rule. l-Š fi'y says that the resemblance between two things is at the surface [Risāla K: 118; 119; 125], but in his variant rule he introduces the resemblance as if it is in meaning. Thus, he says about resolving contradictory analogies:
‫فى‬ ‫ه‬ ‫أش‬ ‫ل‬ ‫لى‬ ‫فت‬ ‫ص‬ ‫ين،‬ ‫ث‬ ‫فى‬ ‫آلخ‬ ‫ى‬ ‫م‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ين‬ ‫ص‬ ‫أح‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ت‬ ‫نت‬ ‫ك‬ ‫فإ‬ ، ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫لى‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ح‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ه‬ ‫أش‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ين،‬ ‫الث‬ / you have to look at the case, if it resembles one of the two known cases in a meaning but resembles the other known in two meanings, then you should relate it to the one which resembles it in two meanings not the one which it resembles in one meaning [15 ix, p. 80 ].
Lowry considered this as a confusion between Sh. 4 and Sh.5 [64, p. 151, n. 134] . But it seems to be a result of the influence of TAR and RS:2-3 on l-Š fi'y.
Also, our previous critique of Hallaq's reading to Sh.4 applies on his reading to Sh.5 where he considers Sh.5 as argument of a similitude [46, p. 23] , but the argumentum of a similitude is 'concerning the purposes of the 'lawgiver'' [99, p. 313] while l-Š fi'y's intention is meaning 79 .
āl-Šāfi'y's Argumentative Rationality
Even if we accept the above reconstruction, there might still be doubts concerning the influence of TAR upon l-Š fi'y's logic. One might argue that the resemblance of words and the logical structure of the rules do not provide inclusive evidence. However, l-Š fi'y did not only articulate RS by TAR but he even borrowed from the later a theory of argumentative rationality. To prove this, I shall first reconstruct TA's theory of argumentative rationality in TAR, and after this I shall reconstruct l-Š fi'y's theory.
The Theory of Argumentative Rationality in the Arabic Translation of Aristotle's On Rhetoric
According to TA humans have several modes of speech. 81 . There are two kinds of demonstration in every Art, in dialects there are consideration or 'i'tibār 82 and saljasa 83 ; their counterparts in rhetoric are proof or paradeigma or burhān 84 and thinking or tafkyr 85 respectively. In addition to the two kinds of demonstration there are also pseudo-consideration and pseudo saljasa in dialectics, pseudo-proof and pseudo-thinking in rhetoric 86 . Most rhetorical demonstrations are proofs, but the most powerful are thinkings or tafkyrāt 87 . The premises of thinking are either truths or signs 88 , and the latter is either mappings or signs 89 . We should note here the following: (1) the obscureness of TA about Analytics, (2) that Aristotle's Theory of argumentative rationality has been modified.
Concerning the first point, the (ancient) reader of TAR either believes (a) that there is nothing new in Analytics, or (b) he may understand that On Rhetoric contains Analytics. TA already spoke about non-syllogistic mappings (rawīsim) 91 . Moreover, he talkes about the cause of the non-syllogistic when he talkes about false signs:
Concerning (a)
; TA says after talking about the ways of demonstration in dialectics and rhetoric ‫ى'‬ ‫ي‬‫ف‬ ‫؛‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ش‬ ‫نه‬ > ‫ل‬ ‫ك‬ < ‫سي‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ئل‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ..
. ‫س‬ ‫س‬ ‫بال‬ ‫أي‬ ‫ه‬ ‫فإ‬ ، ‫الم‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ق‬ ‫من‬ ‫آخ‬ ‫نح‬ ‫ل‬ ‫كل‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ص،‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ش‬ ‫كل‬ ‫ليس‬ ‫نه‬ ‫س‬ ‫<ل‬ ‫غي‬ > ‫ي‬ ‫ش‬ ‫ص‬
/and there is another topic from sign; this is not syllogism either…if one said that Dionysus <was a thieve> because he was wicked, then this would not be s<yllogistim because not every wicked man is a thieve, while every thieve is a wicked man< 92 .
Moreover, the reader who is interested in On Rhetoric, like l-Š fi'y, will not be interested to go back to Analytics, because syllogism is specific to dialectics not rhetoric. Concerning the second point, i.e. the modification of Aristotle's Theory of argumentative rationality, this happened as follows: first, in TAR there are only two kinds of syllogisms (or saljasa) not three 93 , i.e. dialectical and rhetorical. Over all TAR there is no mention of analytical syllogisms, only the dialectical and rhetorical ones. Moreover, TA was always connecting the two later ones so that he gives the impression that there is no a third one 94 . This is being entrenched in the (ancient) reader's mind by the obscurity of TA's hints to Analytics already mentioned. Accordingly, there are only two types of argumentative rationality, i.e. dialectical and rhetorical (and the last one leads to truthfulness). Second, the concept of demonstration became very different from Aristotle's 95 . It is now aiming to persuasion 96 without qualification, i.e. ‫يت'‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ن‬ ‫يق‬ ‫ل‬ / the truthfulness has to be by demonstration.' Thus, in TAR there is no room for scientific deduction, there is only demonstration aiming at truthfulness. If the aim of the truthfulness, on the one hand, is refutation then the demonstration will be dialectical, and if the aim, on the other hand, is persuasive then the demonstration will be rhetorical. Rhetorical demonstration is of two kinds: (1) analogy or proof, and (2) syllogism or saljasa or thinking or the a fortiori. Third, the structure and meaning of syllogism has changed. In TAR the only passage about the nature of syllogism is very obscure and does not explain its very essence: Thus, in TAR there is no mention of the major, middle and minor terms, therefore syllogism in TAR is just reasoning.
āl-Šāfi'y's Theory of Argumentative Rationality
I shall try now to reconstruct l-Š fi'y's theory of argumentative rationality showing how he followed TA.
The General Framework
First of all, l-Š fi'y, like TA, recognizes two kinds of argumentation. 101 . Thus, l-Š fi'y borrowes TAR's general framework for argumentation.
To l-Š fi'y the first task for a mujtahid or a jurist is to judge; ' ‫فى‬ ‫يين‬ ‫ل‬ ، ‫الج‬ ‫كم‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ل‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ف‬ ‫م‬ ‫لح‬ ‫ضع‬ ‫م‬ / know that 'ijtihād is to judge, and muftis in the position of judging' [15 viii, p. 73] . This judgment is the equivalent of TA's 'truthfulness or āl-taṣdyq'. Also, like TAR, there is no truthfulness without demonstration or taṯbyt. Judges and muftis have to demonstrate their judgment.
l-Š fi'y is using here the same term and its derivatives in TAR for demonstration, i.e. yuṯbit, 'iṯbāt, taṯbyt and taṯabbut. Thus, he says ‫ت‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ه‬ ‫أح‬ ‫ين:‬ ‫أم‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ف‬ ‫م‬ ‫لغ‬ ‫؛‬ ‫غ‬ ‫ه‬ ‫كم‬ ‫لح‬ ‫م‬ ‫يح‬ ‫أال‬ ‫ص‬ ‫خ‬ ‫م‬ ‫لح‬ ‫فى‬ ‫هللا‬ ‫س‬ ‫أم‬ / the messenger of God commanded with respect to the judgment especially that no judge should give judgment while angry, because the angry man may fall in two faults; one of them is lack of demonstration… [15 viii, p. 211] 102 .
l-Š fi'y is even using that term (taṯbyt) for demonstrating the prophet's sayings or adyṯ. Thus, he says: ‫هللا'‬ ‫س‬ ‫عن‬ ‫ل‬ ‫يت‬ ‫تث‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ال‬ ‫ل‬ ‫أهل‬ ‫ت‬ / ahl āl-kalām divided concerning how to demonstrate the messenger's sayings' [15 ix, p. 5] 103 . And he is also using the same term for demonstrating the sayings of the companions or Şa abā: 
The Ways of Demonstration
Following TA in saying that there is artificial and non-artificial truthfulness, l-Š fi'y defines (a) the latter as only the book and sunan / ‫ن‬ ‫س‬ , while he defines (b) the former as only analogy or the a fortiori which (c) has reasoning by sign as a sub-category. This schema is matching with TAR as I shall show below.
'Uswl/Elements (Sunan Theory)
TA divides customs or 'sunan' into two kinds, i.e. general and particular 104 . The particular one is specific for one man, while the general is absolute 105 . Both of them are binding for people 106 . The general sunna cannot be modified or changed, because ' ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ل‬ ‫م‬ ‫بحي‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ليست‬ / we are not interfere in it because it is a priori' [TAR B, p. 9; TAR L, p.7] as TA says about non-artificial truthfulness. If the particular sunna contradicts with the general one, people have to obey to the general one 107 , therefore the general sunna is working as duty, while the particular one is working like derivative duty. In addition, the one who writes down sunan has to be a wise man, thus TA says: ' ‫ح‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ن‬ ‫لس‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ي‬ ‫لم‬ ‫من‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ق‬ ‫أنه‬ ‫ى‬ ‫أع‬ ، ‫أح‬ ‫ه‬ ‫م‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ح‬ ‫لس‬ ‫أف‬ ‫لس‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫غى‬ ‫ي‬ / it should be in sunna and its actions some wise man who is unique, I mean that he who is not wise in the praised sunan, may be getting bad' 108 . Following TA l-Š fi'y calls both of TA's sunan 'usūl / elements' 109 , because they are nonartificial according TAR. These usūl / elements, as TA did, l-Š fi'y divides into two: the Qur'ān (the general sunna), and the messenger's sunna (the particular sunna) 110 . Thus, he says ‫ليس‬ ‫أم‬ ‫فى‬ ‫م‬ ‫ي‬ ‫م‬ ‫ى‬ ‫أف‬ ‫م‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ح‬ ‫م‬ ‫ح‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ي‬ ‫لى‬ ‫هم‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ل‬ ‫س‬ ‫من‬ ‫ى‬ ‫م‬ ‫من‬ ‫أ‬ ‫فى‬ ‫ل‬ ‫م‬ ‫م‬ ‫أع‬ ‫لم‬ ‫س‬ ‫ال‬ ‫ك‬ ‫نص‬ ‫في‬ / I did not know about anyone who objected that the people, who preceded us and their successors up to our day, had a judge who has judged and a mufti who has issued a fatwa in things had had not a book or a sunna [15 ix, p. 19] .
This sentence proves that l-Š fi'y read Aristotle and how he read him.
Before leaving this subsection I must refer to two remarks: the first one is related to the concept of sunna in l-Š fi'y's works which matches with TA's concept and attests my reconstruction. It is known that the concept of sunna, in its early developing phase 'as the traditional usage of the community' [82, The second remark is related to l-Š fi'y's insistence on the wisdom or ikma of the prophet 112 . As Lowry noticed, 'Sh fi' offers several arguments in support of the authority of Mu ammad's Sunna, all of which depend on passages in the Qur'ān. … The second concerns a number of passages in the Qur'ān in which the word ikma, 'wisdom,' is paired with the phrase 'God's Book' or an equivalent. In these passages, Sh fi' tells us, ikma means 'Sunna,' so that the passages may all be understood to refer to the complementary pair of the Qur'ān and the Sunna [64, p. 170] . But Lowry believed that this equivalence between Sunna and ikma is a result to l-Š fi'y's inventiveness [ibid., p. 186], and his using to a primitive Basran concept of equivalence between Sunna and ikma [ibid., pp. 184-85]. But if my reconstruction is right, it will be more reasonable to believe that l-Š fi'y paired ikma with sunna because TAR insists on the necessity of the giver of sunna being a wise man.
The real inventiveness of l-Š fi'y lies not in his usage of the primitive Basran concepts of ikma, but in (a) using this primitive equivalence for convincing scholars of his own time with his borrowed theory, and in (b) his considering that sunna is commanded in the Qur'ān itself [Risāla K: 244], thus he connected what TA left unconnected, and by doing so he (c) escaped from the possibility that there could be a contradiction between the general sunna and the particular one; between the Qur'ān and the messenger's sunna, in case of the validity of sunna. Of course the term ''ijtihād' had a history before l-Š fi'y 113 , but l-Š fi'y's inventiveness lies in his integration of that history with TAR's theory of argumentative rationality especially as the translator of TAR rendered enthymeme as thinking/ ‫ي‬ ‫/ت‬ ‫,ف‬ and we know how the meaning of fikr,'ijtihād and rā'y are so interrelated to.
My reconstruction can answer some puzzling questions about l-Š fi'y's rationality. The first question is relating to l-Š fi'y's argumentative rationality: Why did l-Š fi'y consider the a fortiori to be stronger than analogy? 114 This question can be answered easily by citing some texts from TAR which confirm superiority of the a fortiori or thinking over analogy or proof. Thus The second question is relating to the relationship between l-Š fi'y's argumentative rationality and TA's: why did l-Š fi'y choose only the a fortiori argument from all the kinds of enthymemes topics which TA offered? This is for two reasons. Firstly, the Jewish or Hebrew rules of hermeneutics did not recognize any enthymemic rules except the a fortiori, and l-Š fi'y was a follower of the RS without following their contents as we have shown before. Secondly, the mistranslation of Aristotle's On Rhetoric or TAR. This mistranslation identified the a fortiori and the most part premises, and by doing so made the a fortiori the most important topic of enthymeme. This happened in two passages 115 Aristotle was talking in both of them about the most part premises but the translation rendered them as if Aristotle were talking about the a fortiori (and sign) as the most important enthymemic topic. I shall discuss here the first passage which was quoted before. In this passage [24, 1356b 15-16] , Aristotle talks about how (dialectical) syllogism is the counterpart to enthymeme, but the translation identifies enthymeme and the a fortiori as follows: If you do not already know what Aristotle means by 'the most part,' and of course you do not know in case you read only TAR, you will identify it as 'all the more', and that is what l-Š fi'y did. Thus, the topic of the a fortiori (and its supplements as we shall see in the next subsection when we shall analyze l-Š fi'y's concept of sign) became thinking/enthymeme itself, therefore there were no need for the other topics of enthymeme.
The Premises of Demonstration and Inference by Sign
In fact, l-Š fi'y did not borrow only the 'more and the less' topic from TAR, but he also borrowed 'sign ' topic 116 . This becomes because TA's talking about the sign relates it to 'the more and less' topic. In the previous subsection I have analyzed two mistranslated passages which made Aristotle talks about 'the more' topic instead 'the premises of the most part'. In the Greek original text After that Aristotle talks immediately about the premises of enthymeme and how they should be either probabilities or signs, but the translator(s) of On Rhetoric changed the meaning and made the premises of enthymeme or āl-tafkyrāt being the true propositions or āl-ṣadiqāt and signs or āl-dalā'il. This is very interesting because making the premises of enthymeme/āl-tafkīrāt as the true propositions gave l-Š fi'y the justification for considering them as God's duties. On the other hand, TA's consideration signs/‫الئل‬ ‫ل‬ as another category of enthymemes or āl-tafkyrāt was adopted by l-Š fi'y. He even borrowed the term dalyl (sign) for describing this kind of inference: ' ‫ل‬ ‫ص‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ليل‬ ‫ل‬ ‫فيه‬ ‫ب‬ ‫يط‬ ‫نه‬ ، ‫ي‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ى‬ ‫م‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ه‬ ‫ى‬ ‫م‬ / the meaning of this subject is the same as the meaning of qiyās, because in it a sign is sought for the right direction in prayer' [Risāla K :121] . He also defines qiyās as sign (dalāla) 
Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to outline a history of the development of informal logic at the Arabic and Islamic culture as it appeared in the first definite formulations for its rules in l-Š fi'y's Risāla. I have followed this development in the fields of law, exegesis and rhetoric. Contrary to J. Schacht and others, I have argued that, there was no influence on the informal logic of the Arabs by the rhetorical Hellenistic schools of Mesopotamia, or by the Jews of Iraq 117 . The main influence was from the Rabbis of Yemen who translated orally the Fathers to Rabbi Nathan which contained Jewish or Hebrew informal logic rules. This could not have happened without a translation movement which I have called 'Umar's translation movement. This is contrary to D. Gutas' [42] hypothesis that the translations into Arabic before Abbasid times' were mainly administrative or for communicative purposes. There was indeed a disciplined translation movement before the Abbasid's. However, the Jewish or Hebrew informal logic spread amongst the scholars of exegesis and law especially in the school of Ibn 'Abb s (the secretary of the first disciplined movement translation) from which l-Š fi'y learnt these rules. l-Š fi'y also coined the term qiyās, which was current in Medina's linguistic school, to include the a fortiori and analogy. Having been confronted with Iraqi scholars, he articulated the Hebrew logic by Aristotle's On Rhetoric from which he borrowed his argumentative rationality. In doing so he returned to the founder of informal logic unlike the Rabbis who learnt informal logic from the Hellenistic rhetorical schools 118 . Accordingly, l-Š fi'y developed the Semitic informal logic even though he partly misunderstood Aristotle because of the mistranslation into Arabic of the latter's On Rhetoric. Thus, my paper brings us to further researches. Firstly, analyzing l-Š fi'y's informal logic formally and comparing it with its Hebraic counterpart syntactically and semantically. Secondly, tracing 'Umar's translation movement, especially that 'U m n Ibn 'Aff n (d. 35/656) the third caliph permitted Tamym l-D ry to continue story telling 119 (translation), and Ka'b established a new generation of translators, i.e. his sons 120 . And if we can trace this movement, then we may solve partly the methodological problem in Arabic and Islamic scholarship concerning the authenticity of Hadyṯ and the sayings of the companions and the successors. Thirdly, because of the influence of Aristotle on 'uswl āl-fiqh as I have proved, there is a need to reexamination of the relationship between fiqh or rathar 'uswl āl-fiqh and rhetoric and philosophy in the Arabic and Islamic systems of knowledge, especially as both Arabic and Islamic philosophy depended on the misunderstanding of Aristotle because of its Arabic translation 121 .
